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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature Of The Case 
This case commenced with a Verified Complaint seeking numerous counts of 
defamation and injunctive relief brought by Wanda and Dennis Irish ("the lrishes"). After 
the lrishes presented their entire case and rested, Jeffrey Hall and Donna Hall ("the Halls") 
moved for a directed verdict, which was granted by the trial court. Subsequently the Halls 
filed a Motion for Attorneys' Fees, which motion was denied by the trial court. 
II. Statement Of Facts 
Mr. Hall testified by way of his Affidavit in Support of the Motion for Attorneys' Fees. 
(R., Vol. Ill, p. 489) He testified to his long-tenured ownership of the city's marina, 
including restaurant, bar, storefront, and only petroleum pump. (R., Vol. Ill, p. 490) Upon 
their purchase of the marina, the Halls experienced immediate harassment from the 
community, including from both Mr. and Mrs. Irish. (R., Vol. Ill, p. 490) More specifically, 
the Halls had a long-standing dispute with Wanda Irish about the city easement for 
parking on the Hall's real property. (R., Vol. 111, p. 490) Wanda Irish, as the elected 
mayor, caused the destruction of the Halls' personal property, and said she "was doing 
us a favor by not burning them.". (R., Vol. Ill, p. 492-3) As mayor, Wanda Irish insisted 
that the Halls' real property was meant to assist the city's other income-producing 
endeavors. (R., Vol. Ill, p. 493-4) Eventually the mayor used her elected office and 
openly campaigned against the Halls in the public press and the city's own literature. (R., 
Vol. 111, p. 494, 527-31) 





Mayor Irish eventually signed a complaint and caused it to be filed in district court 
against the Halls, proposing to take the Halls' real property by prescriptive easement, 
contrary to the plain language of the city's easement. (R., Vol. 111, p. 495-6, 508-516) 
Mayor Irish ordered the Halls to remove their personal vehicle off of their own real 
property. The sheriff was called and a deputy arrived on the scene and refused to tow 
the Halls' personal vehicle or cite them for a law violation as insisted by Mayor Irish. (R., 
Vol. Ill, p. 496) In the Affidavit in Support of the Motion for Attorneys' Fees, Kootenai 
County sheriff's deputy, Matt Edmonds, testified he received dozens of telephone calls 
from Mayor Irish complaining about the Halls. (R., Vol. Ill, p. 576) Deputy Edmonds 
personally traveled to Harrison numerous times at the prompting of Mayor Irish. The 
mayor insisted that the Halls be cited and that their vehicle be towed, and Deputy 
Edmonds informed her personally that neither could occur and the mayor was noticeably 
displeased. (R., Vol. Ill, p. 577) 
He never observed an actual violation of the law or disturbance of the peace, and 
his conclusion was that it was clear Mayor Irish simply did not like the Halls. Deputy 
Edmonds never saw Mr. Hall be rude or use profane language in any of his visit. Id. 
Despite the police involvement, the next day the Halls found their personal vehicle 
towed from their own property. Mr. Hall confronted Mayor Irish in a City Council meeting. 
Mayor Irish agreed to refund the cost of the towing. (R., Vol. Ill, p. 497) When Mr. Hall 
failed to receive reimbursement, he protested by placing signs in his vehicle about Mayor 
Irish. Id. 
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In 2012 the Halls discovered a camera aimed at their store front door, which was 
very disturbing to Mr. and Mrs. Hall. Id. Shortly thereafter the Halls discovered several 
CCTV cameras placed in and around the city and campground, many of which were 
aimed at their business. (R., Vol. Ill, p. 498) 
During this time, Mr. Hall had been elected as a city Council member. Id. Mr. Hall 
was formerly an electrical contractor in California and very familiar with the exact type of 
CCTV camera and system in place throughout the city. (R., Vol. Ill, p. 498) Mr. Hall went 
directly to the mayor and city officials for information relating to the CCTV, but was told 
by Mayor Irish to make public records request for any of the information regarding the 
CCTV. Id. The Halls made several public records request. Id. It was eventually 
discovered that Dennis Irish purchased, installed, and owned the entire CCTV 
system. (R., Vol. Ill, p. 499) Despite their best efforts, the Halls never received any 
recorded information from the CCTV system. (R., Vol. Ill, p. 500-01) 
In 2013, because of the lrish's behavior, the Halls sought a "No Trespass" order 
against Dennis Irish and Wanda Irish with the Kootenai County sheriff's office. (R., Vol. 
Ill, p. 502, 577) The sheriff's office delivered the notice of "No Trespass" and within just 
a few days again contacted Mr. Irish directly about his alleged violation. Based on Mr. 
lrish's admissions, the Kootenai County Sheriff's deputy issued a citation for stalking. (R. 
Vol. Ill, p. 577) Thereafter, Wanda lrish's calls continued to the sheriff and they were 
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constant, frustrating, without merit, and meant to harass Mr. and Mrs. Hall. (R., Vol. Ill, 
p. 577-78) 
The Halls published several opinions about Mayor Irish. This included their home 
Wi-Fi beam which read: "Dennis and Wanda Irish stocking U2". The beam was seen by 
no person other than the Iris hes at their personal residence. (Tr., p. 158, L. 10) 
The Halls attended mediation regarding their litigation with the City of Harrison in 
December 2015, completely resolving the lawsuit. On that same day Mr. Hall agreed and 
took down any and all business and personal wireless IDs mentioning the lrishes. (R., 
Vol. Ill, p. 504) 
ISSUES ON APPEAL/CROSS-APPEAL 
1. Did the district court correctly grant the Hall's motion for directed verdict 
regarding the statement "Dennis and Wanda stocking U2"? 
2. Did the district court err in determining that the Halls were not entitled to 
attorney's fees? 
3. Are the Halls entitled to attorney's fees on appeal? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
I. Review Of Grant Of Directed Verdict- De Novo 
"Whether a directed verdict should be granted is purely a question of law upon 
which the parties are entitled to full review by the appellate court without special 
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deference to the views of the trial court." Beco Constr. Co. v. Harper Constr., 130 Idaho 
4, 7 (1997) (citing Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 764 (1986); City of Lewiston v. Lindsey, 
123 Idaho 851, 854 (Ct. App. 1993)). "In reviewing the grant or denial of 
a directed verdict on appeal, we apply the same standard that governed the trial court's 
decision." Id. (citing Lawton v. City of Pocatello, 126 Idaho 454, 458 (1994); Quick, 111 
Idaho at 764; Western Stockgrowers Assoc. v. Edwards, 126 Idaho 939, 941 (Ct. App. 
1995); City of Lewiston, 123 Idaho at 854)). "A directed verdict is proper only where the 
evidence is so clear that all reasonable minds could reach only one conclusion: that the 
moving party should prevail." Lawton v. City of Pocatello, 126 Idaho 454, 458 (1994). 
"On appeal, our standard of review is the same." Id. 
11. Review Of Denial Of Attorneys' Fees -Abuse Of Discretion 
"The award of attorney fees rests in the sound discretion of the trial court, and the 
burden is on the person disputing the award to show an abuse of discretion ... If there is a 
legitimate, triable issue of fact, attorney fees may not be awarded ... " Ross v. Ross, 142 
Idaho 536, 539 (Ct.App. 2006)(citing Nampa & Meridian Irr. Dist., 135 Idaho 518, 525 
(2001 )). 
ARGUMENT 
I. The District Court Correctly Granted The Motion For Directed Verdict. 
The elements for a directed verdict are delineated in Rule 50 of the Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure. The trial judge based her analysis on Rule 50, stating: "First, in ruling on 




a Rule 50 motion for directed verdict, the trial court must determine whether admitting the 
truth of the adverse evidence and drawing every legitimate inference most favorably to 
the opposing party there exists substantial evidence to justify submitting the case to the 
jury." (Tr., Vol. II, p. 226, L. 3-8). 
To show defamation under Idaho law, the lrishes had the burden of proof to show 
by a preponderance of the evidence that the Halls: (1) communicated factual information 
concerning the lrishes to others, (2) that the information was defamatory, and (3) that the 
Iris hes were damaged because of that communication. Clark v. The Spokesman-Review, 
144 Idaho 427, 430 (2007). Wanda Irish is a public figure, and it was acknowledged at 
trial and in this appeal that she had the additional burden to prove by clear and convincing 
evidence the element of malice. See Bandelin v. Pietsch, 98 Idaho 337, 339 (1977). 
"Malice has been generally defined in Idaho courts as a reckless disregard for the truth 
or falsity of a statement." Weaver v. Stafford, 134 Idaho 691, 701 (2000). 
The determination of whether a statement is libelous or slanderous per se is 
generally a question of law for the court. Bistline v. Eberle, 88 Idaho 473, 478 (1965). 
This Court has stated, "If the language used is plain and unambiguous, it is a question of 
law for the court to determine whether it is libelous per se. Otherwise it is a question for 
the trier of fact." Weeks v. M-P Publications, Inc., 95 Idaho 634, 636 (1973). The alleged 
defamatory writing must be read and construed as a whole. Id. The words in the statement 
are to be given their "common and usually accepted meaning" and should be read and 
interpreted as they would be "read and interpreted by the persons to whom they were 
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published. 1' Id. (quoting Gough v. Tribune-Journal Co., 75 Idaho 502, 508 (1954)). In 
determining whether a statement is libel per se the court must be able to presume as a 
matter of law that the statement: 
will tend to disgrace and degrade the person or hold him up 
to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule or cause him to be 
shunned and avoided; in other words, they must reflect on 
his integrity, his character, and his good name and standing 
in the community, and tend to expose him to public hatred, 
contempt or disgrace. The imputation must be one which 
tends to affect plaintiff in a class of society whose standard of 
opinion the court can recognize. 
Weeks, 95 Idaho at 636-637 (quoting Gough v. Tribune-Journal Co., 73 Idaho 173, 179 
(1952)) (emphasis added). 
The lrishes rested their case at trial after calling each other as the only two 
witnesses. Viewing all evidence presented at trial in a light most favorable to them, not 
one of the "Factual Allegations" in the lrish's Verified Complaint (paragraphs 5 through 
28), was sufficiently proven. Therefore, the Halls were granted a directed verdict. The 
trial judge stated the following in her opinion granting the Halls' motion for directed verdict: 
Public figures, including you politicians or political officers, hold 
themselves open to public criticism and comment and also have the 
means to respond publicly to criticism, and that is why in order to 
establish defamation, they must establish by clear and convincing 
evidence that the defendant knew the information was false or acted 
with reckless disregard for its truth at the time the information was 
communicated. 
(Tr., Vol. II, p. 230, L. 1-19). 
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A. The communication was opinion and protected by the First 
Amendment. 
The trial judge followed well-established law and held that "Dennis and Wanda 
stocking U2" was not" ... anything more than a statement of opinion. And, again, I believe 
it's an opinion. I don't believe it's subject to something that can be proven or disproven." 
(Tr. Vol. II, p. 239, L. 7-19). This Court has distinguished between fact and opinion in the 
context of the First Amendment protection against liability for defamation as follows: 
We begin with the common ground. Under the First Amendment 
there is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion 
may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of 
judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas. 
The Supreme Court has also noted the difficulty of determining 
whether a statement is one of fact or opinion. See Bose Corp. v. 
Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 104 S.Ct. 
1949, 80 L.Ed.2d 502 (1984). One means of differentiating between 
fact and opinion in this context has been formulated by the Second 
Circuit: 
An assertion that cannot be proved false cannot be held 
libelous. A writer cannot be sued for simply expressing his opinion 
of another person, however unreasonable the opinion or vituperous 
the expressing of it may be. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., supra, 
418 U.S. at 339-40, 94 S.Ct. 2997; Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882, 
893 (2nd Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062, 97 S.Ct. 785, 50 
L.Ed.2d 777 (1977). 
Wiemer v. Rankin, 117 Idaho 566, 571 (Idaho 1990), 790 P.2d 347, 352 (Idaho 1990). 
The Halls have a constitutionally protected right to criticize the mayor. Their 
protected speech included placards in car windows, attending city Council meetings, 
running for elected office, and using Wi-Fi ID beams. 
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B. The communication was hyperbole. 
Opinions and hyperbole are protected by the First Amendment and beyond the 
reach of defamation suits. "Political epithets and hyperbole leveled against the actions of 
public officials are within the freedom of expression protected by the First Amendment .... " 
Hemingway v. Fritz, 96 Idaho 364, 366 (1974). In this matter, the trial judge stated: 
And the backdrop of this and the thing I think we really need to keep 
in mind is the First Amendment. Speech is protected. Not all 
speech, certainly not all speech, but opinions are more protected 
than virtually anything else. And political opinions are even more 
protected than opinions about other things, or expressions of art, for 
example. And this is true even when opinions are offensive and 
terribly offensive without sometimes a basis. 
(Tr., Vol. II, p. 230, L. 11-19). 
In aid of their IRCP 50 Motion, the Halls cited Gardner v. Martino: 
In Unelko Corp. v. Rooney, 912 F.2d 1049, 1053 (9th Cir.1990), we 
held that the threshold question after Milkovich in a defamation claim 
is "whether a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the contested 
statement implies an assertion of objective fact." If the answer is no, 
the claim is foreclosed by the First Amendment. We use a three-part 
test to resolve this question: (1) whether the general tenor of the 
entire work negates the impression that the defendant was asserting 
an objective fact, (2) whether the defendant used figurative or 
hyperbolic language that negates the impression, and (3) whether 
the statement in question is susceptible of proved true or false. 
Partington, 56 F.3d at 1152 (citing Unelko, 912 F.2d at 1053); see 
also Knievel, 393 F.3d at 1075 (noting the three parts for the "totality 
of the circumstances" test as (1) the broad context; (2) the specific 
context and the content of the statement; and (3) whether the 
statement is sufficiently factual to be susceptible of being proved true 
or false. 
563 F.3d 981, 987 (9th Cir. 2009) 
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The trial judge held, "I think it is an exaggeration, I think it's hyperbole, and I don't 
think it is actionable defamation ... " (Tr., Vol. 11, p. 236-237, L. 20-1). 
In the case of Weeks v. M-P Publications, Inc., this Court affirmed the use of the 
term 'blackmail' as "rhetorical hyperbole, a vigorous epithet" used by those who 
considered the negotiating tactics of a real estate developer to be extremely 
unreasonable. Weeks, 95 Idaho at 638 (citing Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Ass'n 
v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 90 S.Ct. 1537, 26 L.Ed.2d 6 (1970). 
Weeks clarified the nature and use of hyperbole when it addressed an allegedly 
libelous newspaper article, stating: 
While this article could not be called a classic in English literature, it 
is evident that the writer did not intend that it should be taken literally, 
but rather as a hyperbole of speech, and it would be so understood 
by the ordinary reader. It is not an unusual example of that form of 
ribaldry resorted to by a class of writers in describing the acts and 
conduct of their rivals or those they seek to criticize, where such 
writers have not the necessary skill or cleverness to express 
themselves in a more parliamentary manner. The article is an 
exemplification of a form of caricature that frequently appears, but in 
a more approved and refined form, in the current newspapers of the 
day, whereby they attempt to emphasize and set forth the 
shortcomings of men prominent in public life, or political parties, or 
reform movements against which the writer is seeking to create an 
adverse public opinion. Many of these writings and cartoons 
appearing in the public press are often useful in creating and 
directing public opinion toward needed reforms or the suppression of 
evil. If the law should hold all this class of articles, whether by 
pictures or writing, actionable per se, without a showing of malice or 
pecuniary loss to the party alleged to have been injured, it would so 
effectively restrain the press and tend to prevent it from giving the 
needed publicity to matters of vital importance to the public welfare 
that it would greatly impair one of the most potent influences for good 
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we have, for all experience shows that there is no power so great in 
suppressing wrong as its pitiless exposure in the public press. 
Id. (citing Jenness v. Co-operative Publishing Co., supra, 36 Idaho at 702). 
As an everyday example, the statement, "You are killing me!" Is not an assertive 
fact that one is homicidal contrary to the law of Idaho, but hyperbole and colloquial 
speech. The allegation that the Halls made an assertive fact that Mr. or Mrs. Irish were 
committing the crime of stalking fails to recognize that the Halls were engaging in 
hyperbole to criticize Mayor Irish. They were not making an assertive fact. The Wi-Fi 
beam was a sentence fragment. The phrase lacked any context or details to be perceived 
as an assertive fact. It could not communicate with the specificity needed to make a 
reasonable person think it was a factual allegation that Mr. and Mrs. Irish: 
Knowingly and maliciously engages in a course of conduct that 
seriously alarms, annoys or harasses the victim and is such as would 
cause a reasonable person substantial emotional distress; or 
engages in a course of conduct such as would cause a reasonable 
person to be in fear of death or physical injury, or in fear of the death 
or physical injury of a family or household member. 
Idaho Code§ 18-7906(1). 
C. The communication was not actually communicated to a third person. 
For a statement to be defamatory it must be communicated to a party other than 
the plaintiff in the case (i.e., a third party). Clark, 144 Idaho at 430, (citing Gough, 73 
Idaho at 177). 




Only Mr. and Mrs. Irish testified. No member of the community testified they 
personally witnessed the communication by the Halls that "Dennis and Wanda stocking 
U2." Wanda Irish testified she saw the Wi-Fi beacon "Dennis and Wanda Irish stocking 
U2" only from her home. (Tr., p. 158, L. 10) 
The trial court disregarded the lack of evidence and stated: 
There is evidence that these statements were seen by others, based 
on not only the lrishes testifying that people ask them about it, but as 
far as the court is concerned, when I open up my phone and turn to 
certain applications, my example would be Pandora, I go to open 
Pandora in my office to listen to some music, always a screen pops 
up saying do you want to connect to this Wi-Fi, this one, this one, this 
one, or this one. It's that same kind of thing. People would have seen 
that, there is no question in the court's mind that that would have 
been obvious to others. 
(Tr., pp. 227-8) 
The trial court further stated: 
... I find it a bit difficult to go along [With the notion that there was a 
failure to prove the communication to others] ... what other purpose 
would there be to name your Wi-Fi beacon Wanda Irish -- or Mayor 
Irish terrorist or Mayor Irish lied, other than to communicate those 
words? 
(Tr., p. 205, L. 10-23) 
However the burden of proof was on the lrishes and the trial court's statement that 
"people would have seen that" is an error of law. The trial court incorrectly relieved the 
complaining party of its burden of proof, replacing it with judicial presumption and her own 
personal experience. 
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Wanda Irish testified regarding other allegedly defamatory statements including 
Exhibit number 3, "Mayor Wanda Irish terrorist". (Tr. p. 146. L. 11) She also testified she 
did not want to go out anymore because she did not want to be asked "questions and 
people saying, are you really a terrorist." (Tr. p. 164, L. 3) There was testimony about the 
signs in Mr. Hall's vehicle saying "Wanda Irish is a liar," and that people would point to 
the signs and question the mayor. (Tr. p. 183, L. 21-25) There was testimony about 
"when people asked you about a beacon saying Wanda Irish is a terrorist," (Tr., p. 186, 
L. 13-14) and "did anyone come up to you?" "Yeah, when that terrorist thing came out, 
yeah." (Tr. p. 189. L. 1-7) 
There was no admissible evidence proving by a preponderance that the home Wi-
Fi beacon "Dennis and Wanda Irish stocking U2" was published to any third party other 
than Mr. and Mrs. Irish. Only one witness testified to seeing the Wi-Fi beacon, and that 
was Mrs. Irish, at her home. (Tr., p. 158, L. 10) No citizen of the community and no 
member of the press testified. The trial court cannot presume any element of the case. 
Communication to a third party is an essential element of the cause of action. 
D. The communication was not defamation per se. 
When something is alleged to be defamatory per se, the entire utterance must 
"considered as a whole in the plain and natural meaning of the words used, and as a 
person of ordinary intelligence and perception would understand ... ". Gough, 73 Idaho at 
178. "In determining whether a writing or publication is libelous per se, it must be stripped 
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of all innuendo, colloquium, and explanatory circumstances. Id., at 179 (quoting Ellsworth 
v. Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory, Inc., 66 N.D. 578, 587 (1936)). 
In Barlow v. International Harvester Co., 95 Idaho 881, 890 (1974), this Court 
stated that: 
Defamatory utterances regarding an individual are slanderous per 
se, that is, actionable without allegation and proof of special 
damages, if they fall into one of four categories. One of these 
categories comprises utterances which impute "conduct constituting 
a criminal offense chargeable by indictment or by information either 
at common law or by statute, and of such kind as to involve infamous 
punishment (death or imprisonment) or moral turpitude conveying 
the idea of major social disgrace." (Cinquanta v. Burdett, 154 Colo. 
37, 38 (1963)). 
This Court in Weeks v. M-P Publications, stated that: 
In order to be libelous per se, the defamatory words must be of such 
a nature that the court can presume as a matter of law that they will 
tend to disgrace and degrade the person or hold him up to public 
hatred, contempt, or ridicule or cause him to be shunned and 
avoided; in other words, they must reflect on his integrity, his 
character, and his good name and standing in the community, and 
tend to expose him to public hatred, contempt or disgrace. The 
imputation must be one which tends to affect plaintiff in a class of 
society whose standard of opinion the court can recognize. It is not 
sufficient, standing alone, that the language is unpleasant and 
annoys or irks plaintiff, and subject him to jests or banter, so as to 
affect his feelings. 
Weeks, 95 Idaho at 637 (emphasis added, citing Gough, 73 Idaho at 179). 
E. Wanda Irish failed to meet her burden of proof regarding malice. 
Unlike statements between private individuals, statements criticizing public 
officials in their official conduct are afforded further First Amendment protection and 
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damages are not presumed. New York Times Co, v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-280, 84 
S.Ct. 710, 721, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964)). For Mayor Irish to recover for an allegedly 
libelous statement, she must show by clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Hall acted 
with malice. Id. (See also Anderson. v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254-55, 106 
S.Ct. 2505, 2513, 91 L.Ed.2d 202, 215-16 (1986)). Malice requires a showing that the 
writer knew the statement was false or acted with reckless disregard as to the truth or 
falsity of the statement. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 332, 94 S.Ct. 2997 
(1974)1. Steele v. The Spokesman-Review, 138 Idaho 249,252 (2002) (quoting New York 
Times Co., 376 U.S. 254, 279-280, 84 S.Ct. 710, 721, 11 L.Ed.2d 686.) 
Ill will and a desire to do harm does not meet the actual malice requirement. 
Weeks, 95 Idaho at 637. 
Actual malice is not defined merely as an evil intent or an improper 
motive arising from spite. In a defamation action, actual malice is 
proving by clear and convincing evidence the knowledge of falsity or 
reckless disregard of truth. Mere negligence is insufficient; the 
plaintiff must demonstrate that the author in fact entertained serious 
doubts as to the truth of his publication or acted with a high degree 
of awareness of probably falsity. 
Clark, 144 Idaho at 431 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
The overarching concern in the actual malice standard is the consideration of the 
compelling First Amendment interest in debate of public issues and those in government 
1 While New York Times and Gertz were cases involving the media, the protections of these cases were extended to 
non-media speakers in Dun & Bradstreet Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985) .. 
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who are in a position to resolve public issues. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 (1966). 
"Criticism of government is at the very center of the constitutionally protected area of free 
discussion. Criticism of those responsible for government operations must be free, lest 
criticism of government itself be penalized." Id. 
In this case, Wanda Irish has failed to submit any admissible evidence to overcome 
her clear and convincing burden of proof regarding malice. 
II. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion In Refusing To Award Attorneys' Fees 
To The Halls. 
Idaho Code § 12-121 provides in pertinent part: 
In any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney's fees 
to the prevailing party or parties when the judge finds that the case 
was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or 
without foundation. This section shall not alter, repeal or amend any 
statute that otherwise provides for the award of attorney's fees. The 
term "party" or "parties" is defined to include any person, partnership, 
corporation, association, private organization, the state of Idaho or 
political subdivision thereof. 
This is in line with the historical view taken by Idaho Courts holding that former I.C. 
§ 12-121 should be read together with former section I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1), to allow the award 
of attorney's fees in those situations in which the Court finds that the action was "brought, 
pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation." Ortiz v. Reamy, 
115 Idaho 1099, 1101 (Ct. App. 1989). 
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A. The Halls were the prevailing party and were entitled to attorney's 
fees. 
In determining whether there is a prevailing party, the Court should first look to 
I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1) which incorporates I.R.C.P. 54d(1)(B) which provides: 
In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and 
entitled to costs, the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider 
the final judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief sought 
by the respective parties. 
As such, since the Court has ruled in a directed verdict that reasonable minds 
could not conclude a verdict in favor of the lrishes, the Halls were the prevailing party in 
this action for purposes of costs and attorney's fees. 
In considering a motion for directed verdict, the trial court is to accept 
the truth of the adverse evidence and every inference that may 
legitimately be drawn from the adverse evidence in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party. The motion should not be granted 
if the evidence is of sufficient quantity and probative value that 
reasonable minds could conclude that a verdict in favor of the 
nonmoving party would be proper. 
Sun Valley Shopping Center, Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 91 (1991), quoting 
Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho 249, 252-253 (1984). 
8. The lrishes' litigation was unreasonable, frivolous, and without 
foundation. 
In this case, the lrishes failed on each and every cause of action asserted in their 
Complaint. The Halls prevailed on directed verdict despite the lrish's persistent and 
unreasonable efforts to accuse the Halls of defamation. 
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i. All of the lrishes' actions failed to survive even a directed 
verdict, which is by definition without foundation. 
As stated above, a motion for directed verdict would not be granted if reasonable 
minds could conclude that a verdict in favor of the non moving party would be proper. Sun 
Valley, at 91. Therefore, in granting the directed verdict, the Court already determined 
that the lrishes acted unreasonably in pursing their defamation complaint (i.e., reasonable 
people could not disagree). Therefore, the trial court should have further found that the 
lrish's case was unreasonably pursued and the Halls were entitled to an award of 
attorney's fees under I.C. § 12-121. 
Similar to this case, in Anderson v. Ethington, 103 Idaho 658, 659 (1982), the 
defendants moved for a directed verdict after the plaintiffs' had rested, and the trial court 
granted the directed verdict in favor of the defendants and awarded them attorney's fees 
pursuant to I.C. § 12-121. Id. The court concluded on directed verdict that the complaint 
was without reasonable foundation. Id. Also similar to this case, the plaintiffs in Anderson 
argued against attorney's fees stating that the testimony at trial indicated that the 
defendant had in fact committed tortious conduct. Id. However, the Idaho Court of 
Appeals concluded, "The trial court had the opportunity to observe the witnesses and the 
evidence which was introduced. The court concluded that the testimony did not support 
such a contention when it stated that the claim was without reasonable foundation and 
when it entered a directed verdict in favor of respondent." Id. The Appellate Court 
affirmed the directed verdict and award of attorney's fees pursuant to§ 12-121. 
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ii. The Verified Complaint signed by the lrishes and their attorney 
pied causes of action that were void on their face because of 
the statute of limitations. 
A defamation claim must be brought within in two years or it is barred by the Statute 
of Limitations. Idaho Code§ 5-219(5). The lrishes unwisely pursued several time-barred, 
frivolous causes of actions in their Verified Complaint. Even if the lrishes were unaware 
of the statute of limitations upon the filing of their Verified Complaint, they were definitely 
made aware of the statute of limitations when the Halls filed their Answer to the lrish's 
Verified Complaint. Yet the lrishes unlawfully pursued the frivolous causes of actions all 
of the way to trial, causing further expense to the Halls. 
iii. The lrishes improperly sought punitive damages. 
The Verified Complaint in this matter failed to assert punitive damages, or reserve 
the right to move the court for an amendment of the pleadings to include punitive 
damages. The lrishes failed to file a pretrial motion. 
The lrish's trial preparation included jury instructions on punitive damages, despite 
pretrial failure of compliance with I.C. § 6-1604, which requires a motion and order of the 
court in order to amend the complaint seeking punitive damages, allowing Defendants to 
file an amended answer and possible counterclaim. I.C. § 6-1604(2) states as follows: 
In all civil actions in which punitive damages are permitted, no claim 
for damages shall be filed containing a prayer for relief seeking 
punitive damages. However, a party may, pursuant to a pretrial 
motion and after hearing before the court, amend the pleadings to 
include a prayer for relief seeking punitive damages. The court shall 
allow the motion to amend the pleadings if, after weighing the 
evidence presented, the court concludes that, the moving party has 
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established at such a hearing a reasonable likelihood of proving facts 
at trial sufficient to support an award of punitive damages ... 
The lrishes submitted both jury instructions and verdict forms that included claims 
for punitive damages. Such actions are contrary to established law and practice, and to 
proceed to trial on such errors is frivolous, unreasonable, and without foundation. 
I. The Halls Are Entitled To Attorney's Fees On Appeal. 
The Halls seek attorney's fees under Idaho Code Section 12-121. The lrishes 
acted frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation in law or fact in pursuing this appeal. 
See Elliott v. Murdock, 161 Idaho 281, 289 (2016). In Elliot, the Petitioner's original 
complaint stated that several of the Respondent's statements defamed her. Id. The 
Respondent won on summary judgment, and the Petitioner only appealed a single 
statement. Id. This Court stated there was no basis in fact or law for the Petitioner's 
claims, and that she had been so instructed by the district court below. "[Petitioner's] 
appeal is frivolous and was unreasonably brought. She merely invites us to second-
guess the district court's well-reasoned opinion. Accordingly, we award attorney's fees 
on appeal to Mr. Murdock per Idaho Code section 12-121." Id. 
Attorney's fees should be awarded to the Halls on appeal, because it is established 
case law that when: 
[S]uch circumstances exist when an appellant has only asked the 
appellate court to second-guess the trial court by reweighing the 
evidence or has failed to show that the district court incorrectly 
applied well-established law. Further, attorneys fees on appeal have 
been awarded under Section 12-121 when appellants 'failed to add 
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any new analysis or authority to the issues raised below' that were 
resolved by a district court's well-reasoned authority. 
Id. Citing Snider v. Arnold, 153 Idaho 641, 645-646 (2012) and Wagner v. Wagner, 160 
Idaho 294, 302 (2016). 
Similar to the Petitioner in Elliott, in this case the lrishes have failed "to add any 
new analysis or authority" to their appeal. Furthermore, the lrishes are asking this Court 
to second-guess the trial court's correct application of well-established law. Therefore, 
the Halls should be awarded attorney's fees for the lrish's frivolous appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court should be affirmed in its directed verdict, and the Halls should be 
awarded attorney fees both at trial and on this appeal based on Idaho Code§ 12-121, 
and Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41. 
DATED this -Z-l day of September, 2017. 
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